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CASENOTES
a reasonable and prudent man. 17  It is difficult to draw any conclusions
from this line of decisions other than to note that the layman's rulings
have been prone to be adverse to the interests of the insurance companies.
The court (in this case of first impression), in holding the insurance
company liable in the instant case, (by requiring evidence of bad faith)
has adopted the majority rule. In Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw,"8
the Florida Supreme Court announced that, although there was
insufficient evidence to hold the insurer liable, the court would follow
the "bad faith" rule. In the instant case, the insurance company flatly
refused to negotiate or compromise; such arbitrary refusal has been held
to constitute bad faith per se"9 and it was so held here.
It is submitted that Florida, by selccting and subscribing to the
majority view, has chosen the fairer and more equitable of the two
theories. This rule does hold the insurer liable for serious breach of faith
but does not make this liability dependent upon mere negligence as




The plaintiff purchased land from the defendant, who orally agreed
to develop bathing beach facilities and give an easement for use thereof.
When the vendor refused to perform, the plaintiff brought action in fraud
and deceit, which was dismissed by trial court. Held, on appeal, affirmed.
Agreements creating easements are within the Statute of Frauds and are
unenforceable directly or indirectly, unless in writing. Canell v. Arcola
Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1953).
Most courts bold that if at the time of making a promise to do
future acts, no intention to perform existed, an action for fraud and deceit
will lie." A minority of jurisdictions maintain that whether or not
performance was intended, future promises are not a basis for fraud.2
17. Ibid.
18. 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
19. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934);
Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 Ati. 708
(1924); Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co.. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
1. O'Melia v. Adkins, 73 Cal. App.2d 143, 166 P.2d 298 (1946); Day v.
Weadock, 101 Fla. 333, 134 So. 525 (1931); Feldman v. Witmark, 254 Mass. 480,
150 N.E. 329 (1926); Rutan v. Straehly, 289 Mich. 341, 286 N.V. 639 (1939);
Brittingham v. Huylers, 120 N.J. Eq. 198, 184 Ad. 529 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936);
Zora Realty Co. v. Green, 186 Misc. 1044, 60 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Harris
v. Sanderson, 178 S.W.2d 315 (Texas 1944); Kritzer v. Moffat, 136 Wash. 410, 240
Pac. 355 (1925); Davis v. Alford, 113 W.Va. 30, 166 S.E. 701 (1932).
2. Sachs v. Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 185 N.E. 856 (1933). Jeck v. O'Meara, 341
Mo. 419, 107 S.W.2d 782 (1937); Woods v. Scott. 107 Vt. 249, 178 At]. 886 (1935).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
An easement is deemed an interest in land and may be created in
three ways; by express grant, implied grant, and by prescription? A promise
to create an easement is within the Statute of Frauds,4 and therefore
must be in writing. Can such an oral promise, assuming no intention
to perform at the time of making can be shown, be the basis for an action
in fraud and deceit? Some courts hold that a promise barred by the
Statute of Frauds will not afford a basis for any recovery in tort5 nor
can it be used as a measure of damages.6 One rationale for this reasoning
is that both parties are presumed to know of the Statute of Frauds and
its application on the promise.7 The mere breach of an oral promise
within the Statute of Frauds is not held to be fraud as such,8 some cases
holding that even if there was no intention to perform at the time of
making, and the promise was used to induce the party to enter the
contract, it is not fraud in a legal sense. Since no contract existed, no
damage, in a legal sense, can arise.10
Other decisions advocate relaxing the "no recovery rules" and hold
that when there was no intention to perform by the promisor, the Statute
of Frauds will not operate as a complete bar.1 A party cannot invoke
the Statute of Frauds to perpetrate fraud and retain the fruits of his
fraud.12 The effect of the Statute of Frauds on the promise is immaterial,13
and will not bar an action in tort.1 4  Neither will it render the void
promise inadmissable as evidence in an action to show fraudulent intent.",
When one is induced by the void promise to act to his detriment, it
has been held that an action in fraud and deceit does not bear directly or
3. Winthrop v. Wadsworth, 42 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1949); Burdine v. Sewell, 92
Fla. 375, 109 So. 648 (1926).
4. TIFFANy, REAL PROPERTY § 538 (Abridged ed. 1940).
5. Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 280 N.W. 814 (1938);
Levy v. Brush, 45 N.Y. 589 (1871); Ossage v. Foley, 20 Ohio App. 117, 153 N.E.
117 (1923).
6. an Camp v. Van Camp, 291 Mich. 668, 289 N.W. 297 (1939).
7. Haskell v. Heathcote, 363 Pa. 184, 69 A.2d 71 (1949).
8. Ozier v. Haines, 343 Ill. App. 400, 99 N.E.2d 395 (1951); Ranicar v.
Goodwin, 326 Mass. 47, 96 N.E.2d 853 (1950).
9. Spencer v. Spencer, 254 Ala. 22, 47 So.2d 252 (1950); Sample v. Ward,
156 Fla. 210, 23 So.2d 81 (1945).
10. Levy v. Brush, 45 N.Y. 589 (1871).
11. Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 117 At]. 803 (1922); Vertrees v. Head &
Matthews, 138 Ky. 83, 127 S.W. 523 (1910); Sehleifer v. Worcester North Savings
Inst., 306 Mass. 226, 27 N.E.2d 992 (1940); Des Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass. 102,
162 N.E. 4 (1928); McNaughton v. Smith, 136 Mich. 368, 99 N.W. 382 (1904);
Shafer v. Ekstrand, 140 Ore. 582, 14 P.2d 287 (1932); Foss v. Newberry, 20 Ore.
257, 25 Pac. 669 (1891).
12. Rahim v. Akbar, 92 Cal. App. 383. 207 P.2d 80 (1949); Gipson v. Fisher
Bros. Co., 204 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. 1947).
13. McNaughton v. Smith, 136 Mich. 368, 99 N.W. 382 (1904).
14. Schleifer v. Worcester North Savings Inst., 306 Mass. 226, 27 N.E.2d 992(1940); Des Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass. 102, 162 N.E. 4 (1928); Papanikolas v. Sampson,
73 Utah 404, 274 Pac. 856 (1929).
15. Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Ore. 354, 55 P.Zd 1122 (1936).
CASENOTES
indirectly on the promise, but on the fraudulent inducement, and therefore
the Statute of Frauds is no bar.' 0
Although Florida courts recognize that promises made without intention
to perform constitute fraud, 17 they are reluctant to apply this rule to
promises made within the Statute of Frauds, contending it would negate
the purpose of the statute.' In the instant case, the court applied this
reasoning in dismissing the action as an indirect attempt to recover on
the contract. They will not allow void contracts to be admitted either
directly or indirectly for measure of damages. 19
In the writer's opinion, a refusal by courts to allow any recovery
in tort on a barred contract, under the premise that the Statue of Frauds
is designed to prevent fraud and should be strictly applied, will in many
cases actually shield fraud. Strict, "to the letter" application of the
statute in cases of proved fraud affords a good defense to the perpetrators.
Would any other construction of the statute cloud the distinction between
cotnract and tort remedies? Considering the injustice wrought by denying
any recovery, it would seem 'that clear thinking could dispel any possible
clouds on the distinction, and strict application of the statute could be
relaxed to the extent that it would fulfill its purpose, to prevent fraud, in
more cases.
Alan H. Dombrowsky
TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-INDEMNITY
Plaintiff brought an action against the United States for injuries
sustained when his automobile collided with a negligently driven govern-
ment vehicle. The government, after suffering an adverse judgment under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, sought to recover, by way of indemnity,
the amount of the judgment from the employee involved in the collision.
Held, Section 2676 of the United States Code bars any legal basis for
16. Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 117 Ati. 803 (1922); Texas Co. c. Sloan,
171 Kan. 182, 231 P.2d 255 (1951); Papanilolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 Pac.
856 (1929).
17. OMelia v. Adkins, 73 Cal. App.2d 143, 166 P.2d 298 (1946); Day v.
weadock, 101 Fla. 333, 134 So. 525 (1931); Feldman v. Witmark, 254 Mass, 480,
150 N.E. 329 (1926); Rutan v. Straehly, 289 Mich. 341, 286 N.W. 639 (1939);
Brittingham v. Huylers, 120 N.J. Eq. 198, 184 Atl. 529 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936);
Zora Realty Co. v. Green, 186 Misc. 1044, 60 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Harris
v. Sanderson, 178 S.W.2d 315 (Texas 1944); Kritzer v. Moffat, 136 Wash. 410, 240
Pac. 355(1925); Davis v. Alford, 113 W. Va. 30, 166 S.E. 701 (1932).
18. Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341 (1938). But cf. McCorquodale
v. Keyton, 63 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1953)(easement for a park, designated on plat, held
satisfying the statute).
19. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 291 Mich. 668, 289 N.W. 297 (1939).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (Supp. 1948). "Ile judgment in an action . . . shall
constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant . . . against the employee
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."
